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Today, natural law theory offers the most common intellectual defense for the differential
treatment of gays and lesbians. Leading natural law theorists, such as John Finnis, 2 Robert
George, 3 and Richard Duncan,4 have eagerly inserted themselves into debates about law and
sexuality. If their arguments are sound, it is permissible to treat gays and lesbians differentially
as a matter of law. Natural law theorists defend a range of policies in this regard, from antisodomy laws, to allowing persons to discriminate against gays and lesbians in employment and
housing, to a fierce opposition to same-sex unions or, in their watered-down version, civil
unions. In general, natural law theorists believe that it is rational for the state to 'discourage'
homosexuality through such policies. Furthermore, they believe that other laws regulating
sexuality are permissible and potentially beneficial, such as forbidding the sale of contraceptives
to unmarried persons.
I will argue that the natural-law understanding of sexuality, and its application to the law,
is deeply flawed, in regards to homosexuality and sodomy. I begin by laying out some of the
foundations of the natural law position. Central to the position is an account of human goods
that are seen as good in themselves, and hence as rational bases for choice and human action. In
regards to sexuality, the two most important goods, at least from the natural law perspective, are
those of marriage and personal integration. I argue that a real appreciation of the role of these
two goods in human life would lead to a practical political stance very different than the one put
forward by contemporary natural law theorists. Much of the argument here is concerned with
showing how the natural law position, taken on its own terms, should actually support a position
that is, for example, at least as skeptical of modem corporate practices as it is of consensual
sodomy. Second, I argue that the account of the human goods offered by natural law theorists is
very culturally specific and even partially contingent, even though it claims to be premised upon
timeless reason and an unchanging account of human goods. This argument involves a historical
foray into ancient Greek understandings of sexuality in order to get a sense of the range of
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understandings across time. If this critical point is correct, natural law theory does not have good
grounds for much of its condemnation of a whole range of sexual practices.
There is already an ongoing debate over natural law that is dominated by natural law
theorists and liberals.5 The perspective that I offer here is unique in that, as a civic republican (or
perhaps 'communitarian'), there are many aspects of natural law theory to which I am
sympathetic. 6 These include, but are not limited to, a willingness to talk about virtue and a
concern for the cultivation of civic virtue, a belief that there are genuine human goods that are at
least partially universal in scope (and partially incommensurable), and a conviction that those
goods help to establish reasons for action (and criteria by which to judge actions). One
difference here, however, is that the account of human goods I would defend is much more open
to cultural variation, without being relativistic. Given that there is a good range of agreement
between civic republicans and natural law theorists, due no doubt in part to some shared
influence from Aristotle, the disagreement between these positions is worth exploring. Perhaps
too there is a greater chance of persuasion.
The Natural Law Understanding of Sexuality
In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas made the most influential formulation of
natural law theory. It is still the classic statement of this position; contemporary theorists alter
and amend it, yet still cling to its central precepts. Integrating an Aristotelian approach with
Christian theology, Aquinas emphasized the centrality of certain human goods, including
marriage. 7 Even though he must have been aware of at least some of the great variety in
marriage practices across time and space, his conception is very reflective of the late medieval
Christian ideal. 8 At the center of his view of marriage is the idea of fides, which in part means9
monogamy (it is the Latin root for fidelity), but which encompasses mutual regard and love.
Aquinas writes about marriage as the 'greatest friendship' which, while realized in0 marital sex, is
oriented towards running a household, procreation, and the nurturing of children.'
While Aquinas did not write much about some aspects of sexuality, such as same-sex
sexual relations, he did write at length about various sex acts as sins." For Aquinas, sexuality
that was within the bounds of marriage and which helped to further what he saw as the
distinctive goods of marriage, mainly love, companionship, and legitimate offspring, was
permissible, and even good. 12 All sex outside the bounds of marriage, whether pre-marital or
5 See generally, NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY
6
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extra-marital, is thus immoral (although some acts may be worse than others). In contrast,
loving, non-contracepted vaginal intercourse within a marriage is not merely permissible, it is
good in itself, even apart from the pleasure and intimacy it brings. In this way, "marital acts" are
just sex, where "just" is meant in its moral sense. Aquinas did not argue that procreation was a
necessary part of moral or just sex; married couples could enjoy sex without the motive of
having children, and sex in marriages where one or both partners is sterile 13 is also potentially
just (given a motive of expressing love). As an aside, it is interesting to note that so far Aquinas'
view actually need not rule out homosexual sex. For example, up to this point, a Thomist could
embrace same-sex marriage, and then apply the same reasoning, simply seeing the couple as a
reproductively sterile, yet still fully loving and companionate union.
It is important that Aquinas added a requirement that for any given sex act to be moral it
must be of a generative kind. 14 That is, since only the emission of semen in a vagina can result
in natural reproduction, only sex acts of that type are generative, even if a given sex act does not
lead to reproduction, and even if it is impossible due to infertility. The consequence of this
addition is to rule out the possibility, of course, that homosexual sex could ever be moral (even if
done within a loving marriage), in addition to forbidding any non-vaginal sex for opposite-sex
married couples. What is the justification for this important addition? This question is made all
the more pressing in that Aquinas allows that the breadth of the moral rules applied to
individuals may vary considerably, since the nature of persons also varies to some extent. 1" That
is, to take an example using homosexuality, since Aquinas allows that individual natures vary,
one could simply argue that one is, by nature, emotionally and physically attracted to persons of
one's own gender, and hence to pursue same-sex relationships is "natural."' 6 Unfortunately,
Aquinas does not spell out a justification for this generative requirement. 17
Although the specifics of the defense of the generative requirement offered by various
contemporary natural law theorists vary, the common elements are strong. 18 As Thomists, their
argument rests largely upon an account of human goods. The two most important are personal
integration and marriage. Personal integration, in this view, is the idea that humans, as agents,
need to have integration between their intentions as agents and their embodied selves.' 9 Thus, to
13
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Sexual Complementarity, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 227 (David M. Estlund
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to move beyond it. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 48 (1979) (characterizing the
"perverted faculty argument" as "ridiculous"); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW (1999) (dismissing
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use one's or another's body as a mere means to one's own pleasure, as they argue happens with
masturbation, causes 'dis-integration' of the self.20 That is, one's intention then is just to use a
body (one's own or another's) as a mere means to the end of pleasure, and this detracts from
personal integration. It is important to note that the argument is not against pleasure, since the
pleasure of what they term marital union, which is-in part-a decidedly physical pleasure, is
something they are happy to affirm. What is harmful, and therefore immoral, on this view is that
instead of having as the end a real human good or goods, such as the goods of marriage and
openness to procreation, pleasure in and of itself has become the end. This is what is damaging,
or 'dis-integrating'.
Yet one could easily reply that two persons of the same sex engaging in sexual union
does not necessarily imply any sort of 'use' of the other as a mere means to one's own pleasure.
Instead, in the context of a long-term, companionate union, it is just as expressive of love and
affection as any heterosexual sex. If John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, the petitioners in
Lawrence v. Texas,2 1 are in a committed relationship, their sex would be "just" too. Hence,
natural law theorists respond that sexual union in the context of the realization of marriage as an
important human good is the only permissible expression of sexuality.2 2 Yet this argument
requires a very particular explanation of how marriage is a good, since it puts procreation at the
center of marriage as its "natural fulfillment".23 Natural law theorists must emphasize
procreation if they want to support their objection to homosexual sex. If, for example, they were
to place love and mutual support for human flourishing at the center, it is clear that many samesex couples would meet this standard. Hence their sexual acts would be morally just.
Furthermore, natural law theorists could not simply revert to the argument of raising
children, since that too is done within same-sex unions. Instead, the biological act of
reproduction is given a leading role, along with companionship and the nurturing of children.
Thus, the best way of understanding the natural law view of marriage 24 is that while it is a single
human good, it is a complex or multi-faceted one. Hence, it would not suffice to call love the
central aspect of a marriage, nor would it be the raising of children. 25 Yet this raises another
potential problem, because this line of argument implies that childless marriages are
impoverished. After all, if natural law theorists argue that same-sex relationships are necessarily
impoverished because of the biological incapacity to reproduce, it would apply just as well to
opposite-sex couples where one or both partners are sterile. Still, at least some contemporary
natural rights theorists recognize that their position 26
does mean that childless marriages are
incomplete or unfulfilled, and are willing to accept that.
The Implications of Human Goods: Marriage and Integration of the Self
From the foregoing discussion it is possible to see how the human goods of marriage and
integration of the self are central to the natural law position on sexuality. I will take them in
20 id.
21 123 S. Ct. 247 (2003).
22

GEORGE, supranote 17, at 139-53, 167-73; FINNIS, supra note 17.

supranote 17, at 168.
Certainly, for contemporary theorists, though, I think this is accurate for Aquinas too.
25 And surely raising children in a household where the spouses do not love one another is harmful.
26 GEORGE, supranote 17, at 168.
23 GEORGE,
24
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turn. My point here is not to deny that they are goods. Instead, it is what follows from them as
important goods that is surely different from what these theorists emphasize. In this way, my
approach differs from that of liberals, who typically try to rule out comprehensive accounts of
the good as the basis for social policy or basic institutions. Furthermore, as a preliminary remark
which reflects this difference in approach, it is worth noting that even though the list of human
goods recognized by natural law theorists is rich and very plausible, there is one significant
omission. The life of active citizenship is reduced to a mere instrumental means to achieving
other goods. 27 In general, I think this fits the pattern of contemporary natural law theorists
elevating the life of production and reproduction, that of work and family, over everything else.
In contrast, I would contend that while citizenship is often denigrated today, a lack of it is likely
one of our collective problems. The Aristotelian position on this, where active membership in a
political community is a significant human good in its own right, is compelling. 28
While marriage-at least when it is working well-can often be a joy and a source of
personal and mutual enrichment, the view of marriage put forward by natural law theorists seems
to be idealized. Perhaps this is because the messy reality of marriage today, with half of all
marriages ending in divorce, and an even greater percentage experiencing infidelity by one or
both partners, plus spousal abuse, etc., might not do the moral heavy lifting they need. George,
for one, agrees that marriage, and hence by extension the family, is in poor shape today. 29 The
reason for the decline, he contends, is the lack of morals laws he so ardently defends. 30 If,
however, we roll back the clock a century, to a time when pornography was not generally
available, sodomy was much more broadly prohibited than today, and same-sex attraction was
driven far underground, do we arrive at a system of marriage that George (or the rest of us)
should support? I do not think so. Even though divorce rates were certainly lower at that time,
there is good reason to think that was a result of social coercion, rather than a reflection of how
ideal marriage was then.
Again, my point is not to deny that marriage can be, and often indeed is, a real good.
Instead, it is that marriage is simply one good among many. There are many other goods, such
as privacy, personal autonomy, artistic excellence, etc. Natural law theorists make exactly this
point, but when the issue becomes one that remotely involves marriage, suddenly almost every
other good is tossed overboard in the name of it. A more reasonable approach, and one that I
believe would be more consistent in terms of the structure of the moral theory underpinning
natural law, would recognize that in the name of fighting a (I believe losing) battle on sexual
morality, natural law theorists are sacrificing other critical goods. For example, this is the case
with the cause of limited government. To see how this is so, it is necessary to briefly discuss the
natural law understanding of morals laws.
Natural law theorists, again following Aquinas (and Aristotle), believe that immoral acts
can be prohibited by law, even if they only involve (to use a liberal term they do not accept) self27
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harm. 3 1 The goal is the cultivation of virtue in citizens, and, failing that, at least the prevention
of greater vice. The potential benefits of such morals legislation are multiple, including the
prevention of self-corruption or the emulation of negative examples, and educating persons about
right and wrong. 32 Proponents of this position, however, are quick to point out that there may be
compelling prudential reasons for not prohibiting immoral conduct in specific cases. For
example, while Robert George believes that contracepted sex is always immoral, he does not
believe that the sale of contraceptives should be banned for married persons (though he implies
that it should be prohibited for the unmarried). 33 The range of potential prudential reasons for
not sanctioning immoral conduct is quite varied. For example, a law that would require broad
infringements upon persons' privacy would probably be unwise. Likewise, legislators should not
support laws that, because they are deeply out of touch with broader public views, are more
likely to encourage contempt for the law, rather than increasing virtue.
One point that follows from this is that, since the laws must be responsive to the
condition of the populace (that is, whether it is generally virtuous or vicious), there is no set of
morals laws that should be applied in all times and places. What is to be hoped for, however,
from the perspective of those like Finnis and George, is that law will help to mold and habituate
citizens and citizens-to-be into greater virtue, allowing even more morals legislation to be
enacted. From their perspective, morals legislation holds out the hope of a virtuous circle of
citizen improvement, where stricter laws help to properly shape citizens, which would then alter
the prudential considerations, allowing even stricter moral laws. From the contrary view, of
course, this is simply a slippery slope of increasingly draconian laws that infringe upon
important freedoms.34
Yet the range of laws supported by contemporary natural law theorists is already
strikingly broad. This is so even though they believe that the American populace is fairly corrupt
and prone to vice. 35 Reconciling the litany of morals laws they favor with the limited
government they also favor is difficult. 36 For example, it is difficult to see how a limited
government would try to legally prohibit consensual sodomy (gay or straight), and likewise
prohibit the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons, and pursue a war against pornography
(in addition to the already unsuccessful war on drugs). All of these are policies supported by
contemporary natural law theorists, yet such a government does not seem to me terribly limited.
See, e.g., id. at 1-18.
See id. at 1.
33 GEORGE, supranote 17, at 151-53.
34 Richard Duncan offers a very interesting position here. He adheres to a natural law position, yet also believes that
the American political system is in such grave disorder, in part due to the vicious nature of American culture, that a
libertarian position is the better option. Admittedly, he takes this stance for prudential reasons, since he believes that
governmental interference is more often harmful than salutary, hence a general reduction in government is best.
Still, it shows the range of possible practical positions that can flow from a natural law approach. Unlike many, I
take this as a sign of strength for this theory. Richard F. Duncan, On Liberty andLife in Babylon: A Pilgrim's
PragmaticProposal,in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 354, 354-68 (Michael W. McConnell et al.
eds., 2001).
35 GEORGE, supranote 29, at 36-37, 190-9 1.
36 Natural law theorists today overtly accept and defend limited government, which is one area
where they diverge
from Aquinas. See, e.g., Finnis, supranote 27. Finnis' defense of limited government is itself limited, however. A
much more forthright defense of natural law theory as supportive of limited government and a strong conception of
rights is made by Robert George. GEORGE, supra note 29.
31
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Since marriage is a real good, it does make sense to construct social policies to help it
thrive, but there are profound limits upon what social policy can do in this realm. Furthermore,
the types of policies that are often defended in the name of "marriage and the family," including
by natural law theorists, seem to have little if anything to do with marriage or families. Instead
of advocating policies such as free pre-natal care and universal healthcare for children, we get
lengthy defenses of why employers should be able to discriminate against gays and lesbians.
Instead of analyzing how to make corporate policies more parent-friendly without unduly
burdening business, detailed casuistry is offered as to why consensual sodomy is gravely
immoral.
The same points are true in regards to the second good put forward by natural law
theorists in regards to human sexuality; that is, that persons need to be integrated between their
embodied and intentional selves. Again, this seems (at least to me) a real good. It is morally
troubling when "one treats the body as a mere extrinsic means: one regards the body as
something outside or apart from the subject, and so as a mere object. A certain contempt for the
body inheres in such choices." 38 For example, by accepting personal integration as a genuine
good, I think it follows that prostitution is morally problematic. In effect, sex workers are forced
into viewing their own bodies, and the bodies of their customers, in a purely extrinsic fashion. It
must be deeply self-alienating, in addition to destructive of their other interpersonal
relationships. Something similar is likely true for those who frequent prostitutes, since it
involves the mere use of another as a means for gratification. Prudential considerations are still
relevant here, 39 but they must be weighed against the moral concerns.
I would go further, perhaps, than natural law theorists in pushing concern for the good of
personal integration. There are deep and very problematic aspects of modem culture that push us
towards the reduction of the body to a mere means. Modem philosophy has too often opted for
a purely instrumentalist approach to nature. 4 1 Hence our physical beings (as Kantians would put
it, our phenomenal as opposed to our noumenal selves), which are a part of nature, thus by
extension become part of this instrumentalist manipulation. Capitalism too encourages such an
instrumentalist approach to humans and their bodies. To take only one contemporary and
egregious example, meat packing plants make the processing line run too fast, which
dramatically increases worker injuries. 42 It also leads to the frequent spilling of the stomach and
intestinal contents of the cattle, which is how meat becomes infected with the virulent form of E.
coli. 43 "A certain contempt for the body," by both worker and consumer, "inheres in such" profit-

37

See GEORGE, supra note 17. George spends at least a fifth of text arguing against same-sex marriage and in
support
of anti-sodomy laws.
38
1Id. at 164.
'9 Take, for example, a legalized prostitution industry that is more easily regulated in terms of the health and safety
of its workers and clients.

40 This is powerfully explored, albeit overdrawn, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE

PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). The rather Kantian language here, of the body as a "mere means" is, however,
not Foucault's.
41 This issue is analyzed well by Charles Taylor. See Taylor, supra note 6, at ch. 25.
42 ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 173-74 (2001).
43
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maximizing "choices." 44 Furthermore, the scale and gravity of the mistreatment of the body in
these workplaces is profound.45
Although this is not the place for a lengthy discussion of how modem meatpacking plants
cultivate a contempt for the body and cause personal disintegration, and do so in a way that
dramatizes broader marketplace imperatives, it is worth supporting this claim with more
evidence. "Every year about one out of three meatpacking workers in this country [s]uffers an
injury or work-related illness that requires medical attention beyond first aid."46 Yet the scale of
injuries is almost certainly under-reported. The annual bonuses for supervisors are based in part
upon injury rates, but since a slower line means less profits, the changes that would create a safer
workplace are left undone. 47 Instead, workers are pressured to not report injuries. 48 Eric
Schlosser records how one worker lost two fingers in a plant accident and was back at work the
next week. 49 "'If one hand is no good,' the supervisor told him, 'use the other."' 50 If this is not
contempt for the body, it is unclear what would be. The list of such workplace abuses could be
lengthened as well as the type of workers subjected to them, such as with immigrant
farmworkers.
Again, while George, Finnis and others point to a genuine human good, do they defend
policies that really promote it? Do they address significant cultural practices and social
institutions that have a reductive and demeaning grip on the body? Or do they just marshal an
argument to defend a (rather narrow-minded) cultural fixation, thus hijacking a real human good
in the name of a misplaced concern (e.g., the prevention of masturbation)? Is consensual
sodomy, especially between committed persons (regardless of opposite or same-sex), really the
most fundamental abuse of the body today? From the volume of space spent on it, the answer
implied by the natural law theorists is "yes." It is an answer that strikes me as nothing less than
astonishing and unbelievable. If personal integration is such an important good that the harming
of it via acts of sodomy justifies criminal penalty, it must also, in order to be minimally
consistent, be taken as a profound good in places aside from the bedroom. Yet I cannot find a
single place where natural law theorists apply this good to the workplace. It is these types of
lapses and lacunae in their arguments that fuel the suspicion that underlying the natural law
position today is an animus against gays, lesbians, and other sexual and cultural minorities.
As a final point on this issue of the implications of the human good of personal
integration, if we grant that there is a plurality of incommensurable goods one consequence is
51
that no one good should be pursued so zealously that it begins to damage seriously other goods.
Again, I agree that personal integration is a real good. Yet is it such a critical good that it does
the moral heavy lifting required to get the conclusions natural law theorists reach? For the sake
44
45
46

47

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
1d.atch. 8.
1d. at 172.

Id.at 175.
id.
49
1d. at 177.
48
50

id.
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theorist, in his commitment to a plurality of incommensurable goods, and exploration of the consequences of that
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of argument, let me (temporarily) grant that non-procreative and non-marital sex involves
treating the body as a mere means. Does this justify anti-sodomy laws? Or a more general
discrimination against gays and lesbians? Because, to point out the obvious, such laws have real
social costs, sacrificing other genuine goods. Having a "permanent minority, 52 legally treated as
second class citizens harms social unity. Anti-sodomy laws also strike at the principle of limited
government and the notion that persons have privacy rights. Banning the sale of contraceptives
to unmarried persons, given AIDS, syphilis, and other pathogens, is a health policy nightmare.
These too are critical goods to be considered and weighed. Natural law theorists' openness to
prudential concerns certainly allows this; their underlying moral theory demands it.
As another example of the conflict of human goods, consider the goods of marriage and
personal integration. As drawn by natural law theorists, there is in practice the certainty of
conflict between these two goods in some situations. Obviously, sex between two (or more)
persons can move from masturbation to oral sex to vaginal intercourse. Sometimes, in a sense,
this is "necessary" to the successful completion of the sex act. 53 As men age, penile function
typically declines. But it is not a simple on-off switch. Usually erections become more difficult
to achieve, yet still are possible. With assistance from his partner (via masturbation and/or
fellatio) an erection sufficient for intercourse may be achieved. Likewise, as women age,
especially after menopause, the amount of natural lubrication they secrete often declines.
Cunnilingus may supplement, with saliva, that lubrication and facilitate intercourse. A rigid antimasturbation and anti-sodomy position denies, in practice, the biological reality of declining
sexual function with age. Hence, even though natural law theorists hold that procreative, noncontracepted sex between loving spouses is a good even absent pleasure, a "giving what is due"
to use Aquinas' phrase, 54 the strictures they believe pertain actually make it difficult to realize
this good. After all, if a man needs direct stimulation of his penis in order to achieve an erection
sufficient for intercourse, yet such manipulation is morally unacceptable, in practice a condition
of impotence has been morally forced upon that marriage.
As far as I am aware, John Finnis has never shown flexibility on this issue. Yet Robert
George has. It merits quoting the relevant passage:
By "sodomy" here is meant: (1) anal or oral intercourse between persons of the
same sex; or (2) anal or oral intercourse between persons of opposite sexes (even
if married), ifit is intended to bring about complete sexual satisfactionapartfrom
penile-vaginalintercourse... If Susan, for example, masturbates John to orgasm
or applies oral stimulation to him to bring him to orgasm, no real unity has been
effected.55
52

1 am

not aware of anyone, even on the far Christian right, who argues that the whole set of policies desired in

order to "discourage" homosexuality will actually end it. The desire clearly is just to drive it underground. As a
thought experiment, those who use this language and favor the policy of "discouraging" homosexuality should ask
themselves, "What if a set of coercive policies were enacted to discourage heterosexuality? Would I give up my
heterosexuality? Would I stop being an 'active' heterosexual?" Since the answers are almost certainly "no" to these
questions, about the same degree of success can be anticipated for anti-gay policies too.
53By "successful" I mean the orgasm of one or both partners. Clearly, sex acts that do not culminate in orgasm can
still be seen as rewarding by the participants, but orgasm is a common standard.
54 FINNIS, supranote 7, at 144.
55GEORGE, supranote 17, at 170 (emphasis added).
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There are several noteworthy points here. George clearly implies that there is a morally relevant
distinction between heterosexual sodomy performed to orgasm versus that performed as a
prelude to vaginal intercourse. Throughout his work there is a defense of a strong anti-sodomy
position, yet suddenly a quite significant loophole is offered, though he does not explain why he
thinks it exists. I will call this loophole the "non-orgasmic waiver," though it needs to be
understood as also integrating George's other conditions; that is, that the couple is a married
heterosexual one. Second, even though he carves out moral permissibility for non-orgasmic
heterosexual sodomy, no such waiver is found for homosexual non-orgasmic sodomy. For
someone as concerned with close argumentation as Robert George, to introduce such
qualifications without comment is striking. I find this softening of his position, or at least
apparent latitude, salutary. Yet it does introduce contradictions into his position.
What makes the moment of orgasm so special? Why is it that oral or anal sex short of
orgasm can be engaged in, as long as things are at least intended to be completed with vaginal
intercourse? One thing to note is that under his definition, an act of, say, fellatio which is not
intended to bring about orgasm yet which does (perhaps the spouse did not pick up on how close
her husband was to what D. H. Lawrence would call his "crisis") would still not count as
sodomy. That is, as long as (heterosexual) anal or oral sex is not intended to be orgasmic, it is
not sodomy, even if it inadvertently becomes orgasmic and is the only sexual act performed.
Allowing "intention" into his argument is a crucial move. In order to get the extrinsic versus
intrinsic distinction to do what he wants, George (and Finnis, et.al.) repeatedly state that even if
the partners are deeply loving and do not intend to use one another, acts of sodomy still do not
count as acts which respect the integration of the person. Instead, they use the body as a mere
means, regardless of their intentions. Now, suddenly, there is the possibility of heterosexual
anal sex to orgasm that does not count as "mere use." And the basis for the distinction is
intention.
The non-orgasmic waiver is also problematic for the overall position in another way.
Natural law theorists repeatedly contrast the "real" biological union of non-contracepted vaginal
intercourse with the "illusion" of union with any other type of intercourse. Moreover, the
"illusion" of sodomy is so grave that it makes persons believe that they are engaged in sexual
relations with another that are potentially unitive, while what is "actually" happening is nothing
more than masturbation. This is dis-integration of the self (for both participants), yet it is also
demeaning to the relationship (assuming that one is involved): "such acts do not really foster
bodily communion between the participants, and may actually drive them apart, since the
gratifications are private experiences, not shared activities. ' ' 56 Given this justification for
opposition to sodomy, there is no reason for the non-orgasmic waiver. Instead, such a position is
incoherent. Finnis' hard-line position against all sodomy is more internally coherent, although it
is implausible and even morally repugnant, in part for the reasons mentioned above.
George's heterosexual non-orgasmic waiver also has legal implications. If the moral
sanction against sodomy is the justification for anti-sodomy laws, George's softening of the
natural law position renders those laws, as applied to married heterosexuals, null. If sodomy
56

1d at 171.
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without the intent of orgasm while engaged in that act is morally permissible, no legal
prohibition could be enforced if the law was drawn in the same manner that George draws the
moral lines. George, however, would likely approve of anti-sodomy laws which only applied to
same-sex and unmarried heterosexual sodomy.
The Categories of Sexuality: Just How Natural is Natural Law?
Since I agree with George and Finnis about the human goods in question, marriage, and
personal integration, albeit with the caveats briefly given above, it would seem like I might
follow them in their specific conclusions, even while putting them into a rather different
ideological context. The result would be, I believe, an interesting position. In many ways it
would replicate much of John Paul II's position: culturally conservative on issues such as
abortion, homosexuality, and sexuality as sanctioned exclusively within marriage (and even
restrictions there, such as the avoidance of contraceptives), yet combined with a rather leftist
economic stance, skeptical of capitalism, especially in its more unregulated forms, concerned
with universality of access to quality healthcare, and critical of the growing inequality of wealth.
Given that, in particular, Finnis and George tend to be rather deferential to the Catholic Church's
teaching, 57 it is somewhat surprising that they do not take their position in this direction. 58
Yet this is not the line of argument I wish to take. That is because the categories of
sexuality that natural law theory requires for the arguments examined above strike me as, with
one exception, cultural constructs rather than natural kinds. Hence, the account of human goods
that is offered should be seen as partially socially constructed. Again, in contrast to a typical
liberal approach, which places the right as prior to the good, I am in agreement with natural law
theorists that comprehensive accounts of the human good can be reasoned, and a rational basis
for public policy. Civic republicans, however, are inclined to see these goods as more deeply
socially constructed than natural law allows. Yet to make the case for social construction it is
necessary to go into some history, to examine how another society understood sexuality rather
differently. Although there are many examples that could be used to support this point, ancient
Greece is probably ideal. In part this is because it has been, by now, fairly well researched, and
because some natural law theorists invoke the names of Plato and Aristotle to lend further
credence to their position.59
As has been frequently noted, the ancient Greeks did not have terms or concepts that
correspond to the contemporary dichotomy of "heterosexual" and "homosexual., 60 Probably the
most frequent assumption of sexual orientation in ancient Greece was that persons can respond
57
58

And, I suspect, ideologically supportive of John Paul II's conservatism on many issues.
GEORGE,

supra note 17, at 281 (writing rather dismissively of Sullivan, "He thinks that he has caught the

magisterium of the Church in a contradiction.")
59Finnis, supranote 27. Finnis also argued that Plato and Aristotle were critical of homosexuality in the affidavit he
submitted in Romer. But see, MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 299 (1999) (rebutting Finnis' claims).
60 There is a wealth of material from ancient Greece pertinent to issues of sexuality, ranging from dialogues
of Plato,
such as the Symposium, to plays by Aristophanes, and Greek artwork and vases. What I present herein is a brief
description of ancient Greek attitudes, but it is important to recognize that there was regional variation. For
example, in parts of Ionia there were general strictures against same-sex eros, while in Elis and Boiotia (e.g.,
Thebes), it was approved of and even celebrated. See KENNETH DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY 192-96 (1989);
DAVID HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990).
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erotically to beauty in either sex. 6 1 Some persons were noted for their exclusive interests in
persons of one gender. For example, Alexander the Great and the founder of Stoicism, Zeno of
Citium, were known for their exclusive interest in boys and other men. 62 Such persons, however,
were generally portrayed as the exception. Furthermore, the issue of what gender one is attracted
to was seen as an issue of taste or preference, rather than as a moral issue.63 Gender just
becomes irrelevant "detail" and instead excellence in character and beauty is most important.
Even though the gender that one was erotically attracted to (at any specific time, given
the assumption that persons will likely be attracted to persons of both sexes) was not important,
other issues were salient, such as whether one exercised moderation. 64 Status concerns were also
of the highest importance. 65 Given that only free men had full status, women and male slaves
were not
problematic sexual partners. 66 Sex between freemen, however, was problematic for
67
status.

The central distinction in ancient Greek sexual relations was between taking an active or
insertive role, versus a passive or penetrated one. 68 The passive role was acceptable only for
inferiors, such as women, slaves, or male youths who were not yet citizens. 69 Hence, the cultural
ideal of a same-sex relationship was between an older man, probably in his 20's or 30's, known
as the erastes, and a boy whose beard had not yet begun to grow, the eromenos or paidika.7 ° In
71
this relationship there was courtship ritual, involving gifts (such as a rooster), and other norms.
The erastes had to show that he had nobler interests in the boy, rather than a purely sexual
concern. 72 The boy was not to submit too easily, and if pursued by more than one man, was to
show discretion and pick the more noble one. 73 There is also evidence (such as physical
depictions on vases) that penetration was often avoided by having the erastes face his beloved
and place his penis between the thighs of the eromenos, which is known as intercrural sex.74 The
relationship was to be temporary and should end upon the boy reaching adulthood.75 To
continue in a submissive role even while one should be an equal citizen was considered

61

Diogenes Laeurtius, for example, wrote of Alcibiades, the Athenian general and politician of the 5th century B.C.,

"in his adolescence he drew away the husbands from their wives, and as a young man the wives from their
husbands."
DAVID GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 144 (1988).
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1d. at 145.
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For example, a character in Plutarch's Erotikos (Dialogue on Love) argues "the noble lover of beauty engages in

love wherever he sees excellence and splendid natural endowment without regard for any difference in physiological
detail."
Id. at 146.
64
Id. at 151.
65 Id. at 147-50; DOVER, supranote 60, at 84.
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GREENBERG, supra note 61, at 147.
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id.

Id.; DOVER, supranote 60, at 16.
GREENBERG, supra note 61, at 149.
70 Id. at 147. A good discussion of this is provided by Dover in the context of his analysis of Plato's Symposium.
68
69

DOVER, supra note 60, at 81-91.
71 DOVER, supra note 60, at 9 1-100.
72Id. at 91.
73 This is a theme in Pausanias' speech in Plato's Symposium. Pausanias, moreover, presents his remarks as a
description of Athenian norms of his day.
74 DOVER, supra note 60, at 98-99.
75 See DOVER, supra note 60.
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troubling, although there certainly were many adult male same-sex relationships that were noted
and not strongly stigmatized.76
Just as the ancient Greek understanding of sexuality was quite different from ours, so too
was their understanding of marriage. As the noted classical scholar John Boswell put it, "It is
particularly difficult, perhaps impossible, to map onto the grid of premodern heterosexual
relationships what modem speakers understand by 'marriage' .... Whereas love is seen as the
motive force today in marriage, both in terms of bringing one about and keeping it together, such
a linkage did not hold in ancient Greece, or indeed in most premodern societies. Instead,
property concerns and the production of legitimate heirs were two central concerns in ancient
Greece.78
The contrasts between our society and ancient Greek society in how the sexual-emotional
domain is categorized are striking. For instance, contemporary natural law theorists emphasize
distinctions such as heterosexual versus homosexual, and marital versus non-marital. For the
ancient Greeks, the former distinction was unavailable, and they would contrast instead insertive
versus passive. 79 The latter distinction was available to them, and was crucial for women. The
punishments for extramarital sex were severe, for both the woman and the man with whom she
had the assignation.8" For men, however, it simply did not have the relevance it does today.
Likewise, for the ancient Greeks questions of status were paramount. In contrast, today
(including in natural law theory) such issues have fallen away. There are also differences in how
sexuality is expressed. Oral sex was very frowned upon, for status rather than moral reasons, in
ancient Greece, 8 ' while intercrural sex is generally unknown today.
For natural law theorists, these contrasts are likely not problematic. The response is
simply that their central category, that of procreative marital sex, was available to the ancient
Greeks. Hence, the moral distinctions underlying the natural law position on sexuality were
known by the ancient Greeks, even if some of the peripheral distinctions were not. It is notable,
76

While the passive role was thus seen as problematic, to be attracted to men was often taken as a sign of

masculinity. Greek gods, such as Zeus, had stories of same-sex exploits attributed to them, as did other key figures
in Greek myth and literature, such as Achilles and Hercules. Plato, in the Symposium, argues for an army to be
comprised of same-sex lovers. Thebes did form such a regiment, the Sacred Band of Thebes, formed of 500
soldiers. They were renowned in the ancient world for their valor in battle. DOVER, supra note 60, at 192, 196-99.
Also see, PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 62 (Penguin, 1951), where Aristophanes' speech praises men attracted to other men as
"the most manly."
77
JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 9 (1994). Much of the material here about marriage
in ancient Greece is derived from this book.
78 It is also not surprising that the deeply patriarchal nature of ancient Greek society was reflected and reinforced
through its marriage practices. For example, the groom and the father of the bride said the marriage vows, since the
woman was the equivalent of a piece of property that was being passed from the latter to the former. As part of the
vows, the father of the bride said 'I give you my daughter for the plowing of legitimate children.' NUSSBAUM, supra
note 28, at 57-58.
79 John Boswell, Sexual and Ethical Categoriesin PremodernEurope, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY:
CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 15, 17 (David McWhirter, et al. eds., 1990); see also DOVER, supranote 60, at
66.
80 DOVER, supra note 60, at 105-06.
81 Id. at 10 1-02.
82 Boswell, supra note 79, makes clear that it was available, but it was not central to the typical ancient
understanding.
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however, that no ancient Greek thinker arrived at the position of contemporary natural law
theorists.
What is relevant here, however, is not the mere difference in categories, but rather what
the difference in categories reveals about sexuality in general. Much of what we take to be selfevident or simply given by nature in this domain-for example, the heterosexual/homosexual
distinction, or marriage as motivated by love-should be seen as socially constructed within
some broad biological limits.83 This extends even to what is seen as sexual versus non-sexual.84
This idea has profound consequences for the natural law position. If sexuality is in good part
socially constructed, and it is intimately tied to certain goods, such as marriage and personal
integration, it means that those goods too are partially socially constructed. Hence, if human
goods provide reason for choice and action, the fact that goods can vary considerably over time
in how they are understood within a culture, and across cultures, means that there is rational
variation in choice and action.
The argument against sodomy, including same-sex acts, has a difficult challenge to meet.
While sodomy cannot lead to procreation, natural law theorists realize that they have to defend
the very strong and controversial claim that "there is not any other human good instantiated by
such acts" either. 85 The existence of other goods that could be realized by same-sex erotic acts
would provide moral reasons for engaging in such acts in some circumstances. Yet the ancient
Greeks certainly had the position that same-sex relations promoted a number of goods, goods
that contemporary natural law theorists recognize too, albeit often in a somewhat different form.
Take, for example, Phaedrus' speech in Plato's Symposium.86 Phaedrus, specifically addressing
same-sex relations between an erastes and an eromenos, states that, if the relationship is a noble
one, there can be no greater benefit for the beloved.87 The things that will be learned in such a
relationship, and the nobility of action, are of the highest importance for the development of the
best character. Phaedrus goes on to argue for the military importance
of same-sex relationships,
88
plausibly contending that they will promote bravery and heroism.
Since Plato's Phaedrus is extolling what is a widely-shared ideal, at least among his
listeners in ancient Greece, how are we to understand actions guided by this understanding?
There is a moving fictional depiction of such a relationship in Mary Renault's The Last of the
Wine. 89 Lysis is an officer in the Athenian army, and his beloved, the narrator Alexias, is
inspired to greater nobility in action by his feelings for Lysis. The natural law claim would have
to be that Alexias and Lysis are in the grip of a deep illusion. More profoundly, the claim
extends beyond these two to the whole of ancient Greek culture. Even though the cultural ideal
of that society stated that it was permissible, even good, to have same-sex relations under certain
This has been widely discussed for the past quarter of a century. While I can do no more than gesture towards a
full position here, and briefly outline a contrasting cultural understanding to buttress the claim, the social
construction of sexuality has been comprehensively articulated by others. HALPERIN, supra note 60; NUSSBAUM,
supra note 59, at ch. 10.
84 For example, partial or complete nudity is non-sexual in some cultures, and highly sexualized in others.
85 GEORGE, supranote 17, at 177.
83

Plato, THE SYMPOSIUM 178a-180b (Seth Benardete trans., University of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2001).
Id. at 178c.
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Id. at 179a-b.
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conditions, this ideal simply led masses of persons into immoral and destructive acts. How, then,
did this cultural ideal survive for centuries? Are we to understand ancient Greek society as that
depraved?
Perhaps the natural law response is that entire cultures can fall into deep
misunderstandings, including through erecting illusory cultural ideals. 90
That is certainly
plausible, even likely. There are two aspects of natural law theory, however, that make that
claim difficult in the example I have used. First, natural law theory holds that human reason can
find objective reasons for rational and moral action.91 Furthermore, following Aquinas, it tends
to be optimistic that persons will tend more towards virtue than vice, although there clearly are
grounds for worry about the depraving parts of a culture. 92 Certainly the traditional view of
ancient Greece is that it was a society concerned with reason, even though it also had irrational
aspects. Second, if we are to understand ancient Greek society as morally corrupt and sexually
depraved, why then do natural law theorists so frequently invoke the ancients in general, and
Plato and Aristotle, in particular? Would it not be odd to hold that ancient Greece was corrupt,
yet be proud that one's own intellectual lineage can be traced back to such a culture?
What follows from the view I am laying out is that, given variation in human goods and
how those goods are conceptualized, it makes sense to recognize a corresponding variety in
moral choice and permissible action. Furthermore, this goes beyond allowing for differences
between cultures. Instead, it has to apply at least partially within cultures, especially since
modem societies such as the United States have marked variation in cultural patterns from one
locale to another. Yet, what natural law theorists are doing is taking an overly narrow, in both a
cultural and moral sense, conception of human goods and applying it ruthlessly across all
persons in all situations.
In order to deny that any important goods can be realized or instantiated by homosexual
sex acts, natural law theorists focus upon the sex act itself. The act in itself is presented as 'disintegrating' and any sense by lovers such as Lysis and Alexias (or Lawrence and Gamer) that it
is part of a larger union or good is an "illusion." In contrast, their presentation of married
heterosexual vaginal intercourse proceeds through a focus upon the context of the sex act in a
long-term companionate union. This reductive approach to homosexuality paired with an
expansive understanding of married heterosexual sex is mirrored in contemporary American
jurisprudence. For example, the majority decision in Bowers stated that the question before the
93
Court was whether or not there is "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."
Similarly, Scalia's dissent in Lawrence focuses narrowly upon the sex act for gays, but upon
marriage for heterosexuals. 94 The same is true in George and Bradley's amicus curae brief in
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On the one hand, natural law theorists assert that certain human goods and moral ideals are self-evident, and yet

also recognize that those goods and ideals are often systematically ignored or abridged. See Finnis, supra note 7, at
33-50.
91 GEORGE, supranote 17, at 1-3 (providing a quick summary).
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93Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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that case.95 This reductive approach is rhetorically necessary, since the denial that any important
goods can be realized in the context of a loving same-sex relationship rings so hollow. In
contrast, Kennedy's majority decision takes in a broader view. 96 An expansive understanding of
gays and lesbians as persons with dignity and meaningful relationships is presented. It is no
coincidence that this broader view underpins a decision that struck down anti-sodomy laws.
Conclusion
If the argument here is sound, at the very least there is no rational justification for antisodomy laws. Nor is there solid ground for several of the other natural law positions involving
the regulation of sexuality, in particular the banning of contraceptives for unmarried persons.
Furthermore, and more radically, I would contend (though it is only implicit in what I argued
above) that there are good reasons for natural law theorists to support same-sex marriage.
Marriage is, after all, a genuine good. Why deny it to millions of persons? Why, even worse, try
to force those persons into heterosexual marriages only so that those marriages can then be a
mockery of what a marriage should be? Does it not follow that such marriages violate some of
the deepest values natural law theorists espouse? There are gay marriages today in America.
The real issue here is whether the state will recognize these unions. As other countries move to
recognize same-sex unions, with Canada now joining that list, we will soon learn that such legal
recognition does not weaken the family. Other societies have similarly97 recognized such unions,
due in part to the belief that such relationships realize important goods.
On one point natural law theorists are entirely correct: if homosexual sodomy is seen as
morally acceptable, it begins a slippery slope that could very well lead to same-sex marriage.
After all, if homosexual sodomy is permissible, it means that same-sex relationships are too. If
they are permissible, it becomes but a small step to recognize the important goods they realize.
Thus the ground is laid for the state recognition of gay marriages. Scalia's dissent in Lawrence
repeatedly raises the specter of gay marriages arising from the overturning of Bowers: "[the
majority's] reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples." 98 Hence, for at least tactical reasons natural law proponents feel pressed to defend
statutes such as Texas' anti-sodomy law. In striking down this law, Supreme Court Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote that the Court decision in Bowers was misguided in that it only saw
homosexual sodomy as a discrete act, separated from any relationship it may reflect or embody. 99
This is demeaning, "just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is
simply about a right to have sexual intercourse."'100 The Supreme Court is hence now on record
as equating same-sex relationships to heterosexual marriages in at least one sense. The day will
come when the Court will recognize the equivalence in every sense.

95 Brief of Amicus Curiae Family Research Council, Inc., and Focus on the Family at 20-23, Lawrence v. Texas, 123

S.Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 20-102). Contrast the passages concerning the sanctity of heterosexual marriage with the
passages
alluding to "same-sex deviate acts."
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Id.

at 2472-88.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., TIM CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED
COMMITMENT
15-50 (1996).
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